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
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# LINCOLN AND MISSOURI

*By*  
WALTER B. STEVENS



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# LINCOLN AND MISSOURI.<sup>1</sup>

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Walter B. Stevens.

*This is the narrative of "Lincoln and Missouri." The relationship was intimate and continuous for eight years. It meant much to Mr. Lincoln. On Missouri the President depended for the effectiveness of his border states policy. That policy he believed was vital to the salvation of the Union.*

1857—1860.

On the 7th of April, 1857, Abraham Lincoln and Francis P. Blair were conferring at Springfield. With that date begins this narrative of "Lincoln and Missouri." The time was four years before the Civil War. Buchanan had been inaugurated the preceding month. Lincoln had come back to political activity. He had shaped the formation of the Republican party of Illinois. He had suggested the candidate for governor and that candidate had been elected,—Bissell of Belleville. Frank Blair had advanced from local politics to the national field. He was entering upon his first term in Congress.

There were other circumstances which made the conference of these two men significant. In March Chief

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Justice Taney had handed down the Dred Scott decision of 125 pages. The gist was that the Missouri Compromise was naught. The political shibboleth of more than a third of a century had vanished. It was unconstitutional. Congress had not prohibited slavery in the territories, as it supposed it had. The leading lawyer in the case for Dred Scott, the St. Louis slave who looked like an African king, had been Montgomery Blair the older brother of Frank Blair.

Therefore the slavery issue suddenly loomed more portentous than ever. Lincoln had made the platform of the new party in Illinois opposition to extension of slavery and had won a state victory. Blair had come forward to champion free soil. Several years he had been held in check on the slavery question by his relative and political leader, Benton. But in the campaign of 1856, Benton's sun had set. The old Roman had made his last appeal at the polls and had been beaten for governor. He had gone back to Washington, stricken with a mortal disease. Blair's cousin, B. Gratz Brown, after being for some years a contributor, had become editor of the Missouri Democrat. In the winter of 1857, that paper was giving more and more attention to the slavery question. Benton sensed the change. He wrote to a wealthy and influential friend:

"I wish you to get the St. Louis Democrat—change its name and character—for no useful paper can now ever be made of it. I will be in St. Louis in April and assist you. The paper is given up to the slavery subject, agitating state emancipation against my established and known policy."

That is not all of the letter. Benton prefaced his demand for a change in ownership and policy of the newspaper. He wrote this indignant reference to Blair, B. Gratz Brown and the other emancipationists:

"My friends told me that these persons would turn out for abolition in the State as soon as the election was over but I would not believe them. For persons calling themselves my friends to attack the whole policy of my life, which was to keep slavery agitation out of the State, and get my support in the canvass by keeping me ignorant of what they intended

to do, is the greatest outrage I have ever experienced. Those who have done it have never communicated one word to me in justification or explanation of their conduct; for it is something they can neither explain nor justify."

The protest of Benton was of no avail. The Missouri Democrat ceased to be a Benton paper. The files of 1857 show adroit editorial steering. B. Gratz Brown continued to combat vigorously the charges of other papers that the Democrat stood for abolition. But at the same time the editorials committed the paper against slavery in the territories, especially Kansas. And no occasion was missed to proclaim, "The Union must be preserved."

Lincoln had a law partner,—William H. Herndon. He called him "Billy," divided his fees with him, but did not share his partner's radical views on slavery. Herndon heard enough of the conference between Lincoln and Blair to write the next day to Theodore Parker, the Boston abolitionist:

"I had a most entertaining conversation on yesterday with one of the leading emancipationists of Missouri, and one of the leading Republicans of this State. Do not ask who they are—will tell you about it ere long. This is the substance of it: the Missouri Democrat is to open and bloom for Republicanism in 1860. The Louisville Journal is to follow, and some paper in Virginia is to fall into the trail, all of which is, as it were, to happen accidentally. The Democrat is simply to suggest; the Journal is to suggest still stronger, and at last all are to open wide for Republicanism. As these two men said, 'We are to see the devil in these border States in 1860.' These two men are more than ordinary men; the conversation was in my office, and was confidential; therefore I keep dark and request you to do so on the Missouri man's account,—don't care for the Illinois man. You know the Illinois man."

The time was most opportune for Lincoln and Blair to get together. They were in close agreement on the slavery question. Each in his State had taken pronounced stand against extension of slavery. Both believed that a house

divided against itself can not stand. Neither was an abolitionist. Neither was anti-slavery in the moral sense that inspired the northerners. But viewing the issue as the great political and economic question which must be settled peaceably, both of them looked for the solution in the border States with Missouri as the key to the solution.

About the time of the conference, Mrs. Lincoln wrote to her sister in Kentucky:

"Although Mr. Lincoln is, or was, a Fremont man, you must not include him with so many of those who belong to that party, an abolitionist. In principle he is far from it. All he desires is that slavery shall not be extended. Let it remain where it is."

Also, about the time of the conference there appeared in Missouri an authorized biographical sketch of Blair which defined his position:

"He is no believer in the unholy and disgusting tenets advocated by abolition fanaticism but advocates the gradual abolition of slavery in the Union and the colonization of the slaves emancipated in Central America, which climate appears to be happily adapted to their constitutional idiosyncracies."

Gradual emancipation became a growing issue. Missouri was an encouraging field to start the propaganda which Lincoln and Blair thought might hold the border. In the first place the slave population of Missouri was comparatively small,—114,935 slaves of a total census of 1,182,912, about one in ten. In the second place most of the Missouri slaves were in contiguous counties along the Missouri river. Blair and the other emancipationists made much of the economic argument. They urged that slave labor was holding back the development of the State. Peter L. Foy, who had been the correspondent of the Missouri Democrat at Jefferson City and in Washington, wrote a series of articles on the unfair competition of black labor with white labor. These articles aroused the white labor. Mr. Lincoln made Mr. Foy postmaster at St. Louis soon after his inauguration. B. Gratz Brown was elected to the Legislature about the same time that

Frank Blair became a Member of Congress. Brown made an emancipation speech in the Legislature which caused agitation throughout the State. Henry A. Clover and S. H. Gardner supported Brown's emancipation argument.

The gradual emancipationists were strong enough in St. Louis to elect their candidates for mayor,—John M. Wimer in 1857, and O. D. Filley in 1858. William Hyde was a reporter on the Missouri Republican at this time. He was sent to Springfield to report the Illinois Legislature. In his reminiscences, given the Globe-Democrat after he retired from the editorship of the Republican, Mr. Hyde wrote:

"Mr. Francis Preston Blair, who became the universally recognized leader of the emancipation party, and Messrs. Edward Bates, B. Gratz Brown, Dr. Linton, John D. Stevenson, John How, O. D. Filley and other conspicuous members were not believers in immediate emancipation. They proposed and advocated a gradual system—a fixed time after which children born of slave parents would be free, and a further fixed time in the life of each slave when all should be free. Deportation and colonization was a dream of this utopia, involving compensation to slave owners who might demand the same for the term of service cut off by the act of emancipation as nearly as it could be calculated."

"It was a sufficient indorsement of Frank Blair in a partisan sense," continued Mr. Hyde," that the political career of Abraham Lincoln, from the time of the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, was patterned on his model. In all their public discussions both were anxious that the agitation of the slavery question should not imperil the Union."

When he took his outspoken position, Mr. Blair began freeing his own slaves. In 1859 he went into the St. Louis circuit court and "in consideration of faithful services and for divers other good and sufficient reasons moving me thereto," set free Sarah Dupe and her three daughters. He had previously freed the husband and father, Henry Dupe.

In the Illinois senatorial campaign of 1858 the relationship of Lincoln and the Missouri emancipationists had its part. The Missouri Democrat supported Lincoln stren-

uously. The paper's correspondent at Springfield was John Hay, who was then reading law in Mr. Lincoln's office. John G. Nicolay, a country editor and one of Mr. Lincoln's political lieutenants, was at the same time traveling correspondent for the Democrat. Hay attended the Lincoln-Douglas joint debates and sent graphic and extended reports to the Democrat. Nicolay also attended the meetings and took subscriptions to the Democrat. He sent in lists of hundreds of names.

Frank Blair went to Illinois and participated in the campaign. At Springfield and at Jacksonville, Lincoln and Blair rode together in the procession and according to the Missouri Democrat were given a reception "cordial and magnificent." The Democrat contained impressions made upon Blair as he rode through Central Illinois with Lincoln:

"No resident of a slave State could pass through the splendid farms of Sangamon and Morgan, without permitting an envious sigh to escape him at the evident superiority of free labor. In the slave States, it would seem that man and the soil which he cultivates are enemies. It would seem that he must extort its produce as the tax-gatherer extorts tribute from a conquered but hostile people. In the free States, on the contrary, the soil seems to shower its wealth upon the cultivator with a most generous and royal bounty. It brings forth kindly all abundance, and smiles upon him in all the four seasons. The dumb earth itself seems to wear a cheerless aspect, and to yield its wealth charily and reluctantly to slave labor."

After the senatorial campaign Lincoln's relations with the Missouri emancipationists became still closer. Hay continued his connection with the Democrat. His correspondence went from Lincoln's office. It was frequently inspired directly by Mr. Lincoln. Tradition has it that Mr. Lincoln wrote some of the articles to appear in the Democrat. Mr. Lincoln had the same strong appreciation for close press connection that Benton had. At different periods he had written much for the Springfield Journal. Now he cultivated this relationship with the Missouri Democrat for a double

reason. St. Louis was a city much larger and more important than Chicago. But more than that, the St. Louis newspaper connection was a strong factor in the border states campaign of 1860 for which Lincoln and Blair had laid the basis in 1857.

#### LINCOLN'S NOMINATION.

Into this intimate relationship of Lincoln and Missouri entered a personality not publicly conspicuous at the time but of great influence. Blair and Brown and other young men were in the foreground carrying the banners of free soil, free democracy, gradual emancipation, white labor, colonization and the like. In the background was Edward Bates counseling and encouraging. He had seen the great Whig party go to pieces. He was in sympathy with the work of new party construction which Lincoln was doing in Illinois. He was not openly active in the Lincoln movement. He was the wise adviser. When the time came to send a delegation from Missouri to the Republican nominating convention at Chicago in 1860, Mr. Bates permitted his name to be used as the ostensible candidate of his State. The delegation went instructed for him, but, as Mr. Bates afterwards explained, this was not with the expectation on his or the delegation's part that he would be nominated. The well understood purpose was to hold the delegation intact against an eastern candidate,—William H. Seward or any other who might develop strength. Lincoln was the choice of the Missourians and the vote was to be given to him when it would do the most good. The border states plan, which Blair and the other gradual emancipationists had been organizing, was not to be revealed by publicly committing Missouri to Lincoln.

When the delegates came together in Chicago it appeared that the organization,—the machine as it would be called now,—was for Seward. The New Yorkers came with much beating of drums. The delegates were accompanied by a small army of shouters, and as the latter marched and counter marched they were headed by John C. Heenan, the

Benicia boy, the champion American pugilist, as their standard bearer. Seemingly the support of the other candidates was local and not impressive upon the uninstructed delegates. Then came the surprise which Blair and the other border states men had prepared.

The youngest delegate in that convention was A. G. Proctor. He was a member of the Kansas delegation. The Illinois Historical Society preserves in its collection at Springfield Mr. Proctor's personal recollections of the influences and arguments which turned Kansas and other uninstructed States to Lincoln and made his nomination certain. The delegates according to Mr. Proctor were about equally divided into two elements:

"The element represented largely by the eastern people who were of that great moral upheaval against slavery as an institution, who hated it for its hateful self.

"The element willing to tolerate slavery within limits where it existed and seemed to belong, but determined to prevent its extension into the free northwest at every hazard, even to the invoking of civil war."

"The first element," said Mr. Proctor, "wanted Seward. The second element was looking for a leader. At this juncture there came to the front, from sources not before taken into consideration, a movement led by the men of the border States. This body of resolute men from Maryland, from the mountains of Virginia, from Eastern Tennessee, from Kentucky and from all over Missouri had organized and selected Cassius M. Clay as leader and spokesman. They were a group of men as earnest as I have ever met. They asked for a conference with us, which we arranged without delay. The Kansas delegation was the first to receive them. It may have occurred to them that Kansas was awake to what was coming, and would more likely appreciate the full force of their logic. The company completely filled our room. There was something about the atmosphere of that meeting that seemed to mean business. Mr. Clay was a man of strong personality. He had all of the mannerisms of a real Kentucky 'colonel'—very courtly, very earnest, very eloquent in address.

" 'Gentlemen,' he said in beginning, 'we are on the verge of a great civil war.'

"One of our Kansas delegates said, 'Mr. Clay, we have heard that before.'

"Clay straightened himself and, with a real oratorical pose, exclaimed 'Sir, you undoubtedly have heard that before. But,

sir, you will soon have it flashed to you in a tone that will carry certain conviction.' He went on: 'We are from the South. We know our people well. I say to you the South is getting ready for war. In that great strip of border land, reaching from the eastern shore of Maryland to the western border of Missouri, stands a body of resolute men, determined that this Union shall not be destroyed without resistance. We are not pro-slavery men. We are not anti-slavery men, but Union Republicans, ready and willing to take up arms for the defense of the border. We are intensely in earnest. It means very much—what you do here—to you and to us. Our homes and all we possess are in peril. We want to hold this Union strength for a Union army. We want to work with you for a nomination which will give us courage and confidence. We want you to nominate Abraham Lincoln. Mr. Lincoln was born among us, and we believe in him. Give us Lincoln for a leader and I promise you we will push back the disloyal hordes of secession and transfer the line of border warfare from the Ohio to the regions beyond the Tennessee, where it belongs. We will make war upon the enemies of our country at home and join you in driving secession to its lair. Do this for us, and let us go home and prepare for the conflict.'

"No one could give a satisfactory report of that appeal. It was the most impressive talk that I had ever listened to. That delegation of border men, headed by Mr. Clay, made this appeal to most of the delegations of the different States. The effect was instantly felt. There was getting together of those who felt the Lincoln sentiment all along the line. This movement formed the group around which the earnest Lincoln men rallied and organized their forces. I honestly believe that this was the movement that gave Mr. Lincoln his nomination. It was the turning point. It awoke all to a realization of what was before us and compelled recognition of a new element on which might rest great results for good or evil. In short, this action of the bordermen set us thinking."

Lincoln was nominated. One of the earliest and strongest and most effective indorsements of the nomination came from Edward Bates. In a letter to O. H. Browning, Mr. Bates not only declared for Lincoln but he pointed out in his convincing way the peculiar fitness of Mr. Lincoln for the conditions confronting the country. He considered Mr. Lincoln stronger than the platform.

"As to the platform," Mr. Bates wrote, "I have little to say, because whether good or bad, that will not constitute the ground of my support of Mr. Lincoln."

"I consider Mr. Lincoln a sound, safe, national man. He could not be sectional if he tried. His birth, the habits of his life



and his geographical position compel him to be national. All his feelings and interests are identified with the great valley of the Mississippi, near whose center he has spent his whole life. That valley is not a section, but conspicuously the body of the nation, and, large as it is, it is not capable of being divided into sections, for the great river cannot be divided. It is one and indivisible and the north and the south are alike necessary to its comfort and prosperity. Its people, too, in all their interests and affections, are as broad and generous as the regions they inhabit. They are emigrants, a mixed multitude, coming from every State in the Union, and from most countries in Europe. They are unwilling, therefore, to submit to any one petty local standard. They love the nation as a whole, and they love all its parts, for they are bound to them all, not only by a feeling of common interest and mutual dependence, but also by the recollections of childhood and youth, by blood and friendship, and by all those social and domestic charities which sweeten life, and make this world worth living in. The valley is beginning to feel its power, and will soon be strong enough to dictate the law of the land. Whenever that state of things shall come to pass, it will be most fortunate for the nation to find the powers of the government lodged in the hands of men whose habits of thought, whose position and surrounding circumstances constrain them to use those powers for general and not sectional ends."

With such broad and statesmanlike views of the situation, Mr. Bates led up to his personal and intimate estimate of Mr. Lincoln:

"I have known Mr. Lincoln for more than twenty years, and therefore have a right to speak of him with some confidence. As an individual he has earned a high reputation for truth, courage, candor, morals and amiability, so that as a man he is most trustworthy. And in this particular he is more entitled to our esteem than some other men, his equals, who had far better opportunities and aids in early life. His talents and the will to use them to the best advantage are unquestionable; and the proof is found in the fact that, in every position in life, from his humble beginning to his present well earned elevation, he has more than fulfilled the best hopes of his friends. And now in the full vigor of his manhood and in the honest pride of having made himself what he is, he is the peer of the first men of the nation, well able to sustain himself and advance his cause against any adversary, and in any field where mind and knowledge are the weapons used. In politics he has acted out the principles of his own moral and intellectual character. He has not concealed his thoughts or hidden his light under a bushel. With the boldness of conscious rectitude and the frankness of

downright honesty, he has not failed to avow his opinions of public officers upon all fitting occasions. I give my opinion freely in favor of Mr. Lincoln and I hope that for the good of the whole country he may be elected."

#### LINCOLN AND THE BLAIRS.

Lincoln was elected. Missouri gave him only 17,028 votes out of more than 165,000. But Missouri divided hopelessly the great bulk of the vote in large sections among three other Presidential tickets. The effect of the campaign, which the gradual emancipationists had carried on in Missouri after the Lincoln-Blair conference at Springfield in 1857, was not to be judged by the Lincoln vote of 17,028. It was to be traced in the disintegration of the great majority into helpless factions. Missouri polled that year one vote for every six white persons in the population. Nearly the entire voting strength was brought to the polls by the intense interest felt. Douglas carried the State, but by only one-third of the vote cast. He led the Constitutional Union party by fewer than 600 votes. The disturbing influence of the slavery issue raised by Lincoln and the Missouri emancipationists had done its worst for Missouri. It had broken party lines. It had shattered the Democratic organization.

Lincoln was elected. Edward Bates had declined a place in the Fillmore cabinet a few years previously. So much concerned about the national situation was he now that he accepted the appointment of Attorney General in the Lincoln cabinet. Montgomery Blair, brother of Frank Blair, was appointed Postmaster General. This was equivalent to giving Missouri two of the seven places in the cabinet for Montgomery Blair had lived fifteen years in Missouri and had moved to Washington only a short time before. Here is more evidence of what his relationship with Missouri meant in the mind of President Lincoln. Other proofs came in quick succession. Frank Blair made trips to Springfield between the election in November and the departure of Lincoln for Washington in February. He kept the President-elect informed of every step in that game that was going on

for the possession of the St. Louis arsenal with its 60,000 muskets and munitions of war, more than there was in all of the other slave States. He told Mr. Lincoln that if the southern rights administration of Missouri gained control of the arsenal and its contents the State would be carried into the Confederacy and with Missouri the other border States would be lost. Blair was in Springfield the latter part of February and from there he hurried to Washington to report the rumor that the secessionists would attempt to seize the arsenal on the day of Lincoln's inauguration and to urge President Buchanan to put Lyon in charge. The Minute Men allowed the 4th of March to pass without the threatened attack. Nine days later President Lincoln gave Lyon command of the arsenal and the opportunity of the state government was lost.

Fort Sumpter fell on the 13th of April. The President called for 75,000 men, of which Missouri's quota was four regiments of infantry. Governor Claiborne F. Jackson replied to the President's call:

"Not one man will Missouri furnish to carry on such an unholy crusade."

Frank Blair arrived in St. Louis from Washington the day Governor Jackson sent the foregoing message. He had in his pocket an order on the arsenal for 5,000 muskets "to arm loyal citizens," another indication of what "Lincoln and Missouri" meant. Blair telegraphed to Washington:

"Send order at once for mustering men into service to Captain N. Lyon. It will then be surely executed, and we will fill your requisition in two days."

The order came, "muster into service four regiments." This was done. A week later, on the 30th of April, Mr. Lincoln gave expression to his extraordinary relationship with Missouri in the following, addressed to Captain Lyon:

"The President of the United States directs that you enroll in the military service of the United States the loyal citizens of St. Louis and vicinity, not exceeding with those heretofore enlisted, ten thousand in number, for the purpose of maintaining the authority of the United States and for the

protection of the peaceable inhabitants of Missouri; and you will, if deemed necessary for that purpose by yourself and by Messrs. Oliver D. Filley, John How, James O. Broadhead, Samuel T. Glover, J. J. Witzig and Francis P. Blair, Jr., proclaim martial law in the city of St. Louis."

There is no parallel to this act in that early period of the war. Old General Winfield Scott commanding the army wrote his indorsement on the order:

"It is revolutionary times, and therefore I do not object to the irregularity of this."

It was revolution. But President Lincoln realized what it meant to hold Missouri in the Union and he did not stop at revolution which put State and city in the control of a committee of public safety composed of Missourians he trusted.

In those four or five early months of 1861, which settled Missouri's status, Frank Blair was going and coming between Washington and St. Louis. He came home from one of these trips with another proof in his pocket of what Lincoln and Missouri meant. This was no less than an order for the removal of General W. S. Harney at such time as Blair in his judgment should deem best. After Blair had departed with this order the President wrote to him a personal letter, dated May 18. This was eight days after the Camp Jackson affair:

"We have a good deal of anxiety here about St. Louis. I understand an order has gone from the War Department to you, to be delivered or withheld in your discretion, relieving General Harney from his command. I was not quite satisfied with the order when it was made, though on the whole I thought it best to make it; but since then I have become more doubtful of its propriety. I do not write to countermand it, but to say I wish you would withhold it, unless in your judgment the necessity to the contrary is very urgent. There are several reasons for this. We had better have him as a friend than an enemy. It will dissatisfy a good many who otherwise would be quiet. More than all, we first relieve him, then restore him, and now if we relieve

him again the public ask, why this vacillation? "Still, if in your judgment it is indispensable, let it be so."

The influence of the Blairs with Mr. Lincoln was strong. Not only was the younger Montgomery Blair an official adviser, not only was the judgment of Francis P. Blair in Missouri matters of great weight, but the President listened in regard to his cherished border States policy to the counsel of the elder Montgomery Blair. The relationship was peculiar. The President was not under the influence of the Blairs in the sense that he leaned weakly upon them. But he believed that the maintenance of the Union depended upon the course of Missouri and the other border States. In that belief, he recognized the value of the advice and support of the Blairs. Just how he regarded the Blairs is shown in one of the President's informal talks which John Hay wrote into his diary:

"The Blairs have to an unusual degree the spirit of clan. Their family is a close corporation. Frank is their hope and pride. They have a way of going with a rush for anything they undertake; especially have Montgomery and the old gentleman."

When he talked in this way, the President had in mind the Fremont fiasco in Missouri.

#### FREMONT AND MISSOURI.

On the first day of July, 1861, John C. Fremont came home from France. On the third of July he was appointed a major general and the Western Department with headquarters at St. Louis was created for him. Fremont reached St. Louis on the 25th of July. Then followed in quick succession the disastrous battle of Wilson's Creek and Lyon's death and Fremont's proclamation. Fremont declared martial law throughout Missouri. He ordered that "all persons who shall be taken with arms in their hands within these lines shall be tried by court-martial and if found guilty shall be shot." He declared the property of all persons in the State of Missouri who shall take up arms against the United States or who shall be directly proven to have taken an active

part with their enemies in the field, "to be confiscated." And "their slaves, if any they have, are hereby declared freemen."

This brief reference to Fremont's three months in Missouri is necessary to the understanding of Mr. Lincoln's intimate relations with this State. Fremont was appointed a major general and given the command in Missouri on the "earnest solicitation" of the Blairs. This President Lincoln stated afterwards in conversation which John Hay, his secretary, wrote in his diary. Mr. Lincoln said that he "thought well of Fremont" at the time but afterwards concluded that the general had "absolutely no military capacity." The Blairs reached this conclusion before Mr. Lincoln did. Frank Blair went to St. Louis to help Fremont get well started. "At last," said Mr. Lincoln, "the tone of Frank's letters changed. It was a change from confidence to doubt and uncertainty. They were pervaded with a tone of sincere sorrow and of fear that Fremont would fail. Montgomery showed them to me, and we were both grieved at the prospect. Soon came the news that Fremont had issued his emancipation order, and had set up a bureau of abolition, giving free papers, and occupying his time apparently with little else."

Immediately after seeing Fremont's emancipation order Mr. Lincoln wrote him:

"Two points in your proclamation of August 20 give me some anxiety:

"First. Should you shoot a man, according to the proclamation, the Confederates would very certainly shoot our best men in their hands in retaliation; and so, man for man, indefinitely. It is, therefore, my order that you allow no man to be shot under the proclamation, without first having my approbation and consent.

"Second. I think there is great danger that the closing paragraph, in relation to the confiscation of property and the liberating slaves of traitorous owners, will alarm our southern Union friends and turn them against us; perhaps ruin our rather fair prospect for Kentucky. Allow me, there-

fore, to ask that you will, as of your own motion, modify that paragraph so as to conform to the first and fourth sections of the act of Congress entitled, 'An act to confiscate property used for insurrectionary purposes,' approved August 6, 1861, and a copy of which act I herewith send you.

"This letter is written in a spirit of caution, and not of censure. I send it by special messenger, in order that it may certainly and speedily reach you."

Frank Blair had become so convinced that Fremont was doing the Union cause great injury in Missouri that he criticised him in a newspaper article. Fremont placed Blair under arrest. Blair then sent to Washington charges against Fremont. Montgomery Blair, the younger, on the suggestion of Mr. Lincoln, came on to St. Louis to make a personal investigation. On the way he passed Mrs. Fremont, the daughter of Thomas H. Benton, taking to Washington the answer of her husband to the President's letter asking that the proclamation be modified. Mrs. Fremont arrived at a late hour, went to the White House about midnight and insisted upon a personal interview with the President. The President, describing to friends the experience, said she "taxed me so violently with many things that I had to exercise all the awkward tact I have to avoid quarreling with her. She surprised me by asking why their enemy, Montgomery Blair, had been sent to Missouri. She more than once intimated that if General Fremont should decide to try conclusions with me, he could set up for himself."

Fremont declined to be guided by the President's friendly suggestion. He defended his action in regard to slaves. He insisted that an official order be issued directing him to change his proclamation if it must be done. The order was sent. It drew upon Mr. Lincoln harsh criticism from anti-slavery people in the North. It intensified the factional differences in Missouri. In a few weeks Fremont was relieved.

The President regarded Fremont's proclamation more seriously than his friendly letter might indicate. He wrote another letter, much longer, to O. H. Browning of Illinois showing that Fremont's action was a dangerous menace to

the border States policy. This letter he marked "Private and Confidential." Mr. Browning made the letter public before the Illinois Bar Association in 1882.

Executive Mansion, Washington, Sept. 22, 1861.

Hon. O. H. Browning.

My Dear Sir: Yours of the 17th is just received, and coming from you, I confess it astonishes me. That you should object to my adhering to a law, which you had assisted in making, and presenting to me, less than a month before, is odd enough. But this is a very small part. General Fremont's proclamation, as to confiscation of property, and the liberation of slaves, is purely political and not within the range of military law or necessity. If a commanding general finds a necessity to seize a farm of a private owner, for a pasture, an encampment, or a fortification, he has the right to do so, and to so hold it, as long as the necessity lasts; and this is within military law, because within military necessity. But to say the farm shall no longer belong to the owner, or his heirs forever, and this, as well when the farm is not needed for military purposes as when it is, is purely political, without the savor of military law about it. And the same is true of slaves. If the general needs them he can seize them and use them, but when the need is past, it is not for him to fix their permanent future condition. That must be settled according to laws made by lawmakers, and not by military proclamations. The proclamation in the point in question is simply "dictatorship." It assumes that the general may do anything he pleases—confiscate the lands and free the slaves of loyal people, as well as of disloyal ones. And going the whole figure, I have no doubt, would be more popular, with some thoughtless people, than that which has been done! But I cannot assume this reckless position, nor allow others to assume it on my responsibility.

You speak of it as being the only means of saving the Government. On the contrary, it is itself the surrender of the Government. Can it be pretended that it is any longer the Government of the United States—any government of constitution and laws—wherein a general or a president may make permanent rules of property by proclamation? I do not say Congress might not with propriety pass a law on the point, just as General Fremont proclaimed. I do not say I might not, as a Member of Congress, vote for it. What I object to is, that I, as President, shall expressly or impliedly seize and exercise the permanent legislative functions of the Government.

So much as to principle. Now as to policy. No doubt the thing was popular in some quarters, and would have been more so



if it had been a general declaration of emancipation. The Kentucky Legislature would not budge till that proclamation was modified; and General Anderson telegraphed me that on the news of General Fremont having actually issued deeds of manumission, a whole company of our volunteers threw down their arms and disbanded. I was so assured as to think it probable that the very arms we had furnished Kentucky would be turned against us. I think to lose Kentucky is nearly the same as to lose the whole game. Kentucky gone, we cannot hold Missouri, nor, as I think, Maryland. These all against us, and the job on our hands is too large for us. We would as well consent to separation at once, including the surrender of the capital. On the contrary, if you will give up your restlessness for new positions, and back me manfully on the grounds upon which you and other kind friends gave me the election, and have approved in my public documents, we shall go through triumphantly. You must not understand I took my course on the proclamation because of Kentucky. I took the same ground in a private letter to General Fremont before I heard from Kentucky.

You think I am inconsistent because I did not also forbid General Fremont to shoot men under the proclamation. I understand that to be within military law, but I also think, and so privately wrote General Fremont, that it is impolitic in this, that our adversaries have the power, and will certainly exercise it, to shoot as many of our men as we shoot of theirs. I did not say this in the public letter, because it is a subject I prefer not to discuss in the hearing of our enemies.

There has been no thought of removing General Fremont on any ground connected with this proclamation, and if there has been any wish for his removal on any ground, our mutual friend Sam Glover can probably tell you what it was. I hope no real necessity for it exists on any ground.

Your friend, as ever,  
A. Lincoln.

#### "COMPENSATED ABOLISHMENT."

"Compensated abolishment" was a phrase which became widely current in the winter of 1861-2. It was coined in the border States' policy of the Administration. Lincoln and the Missourians who had been for gradual emancipation before the war were now for compensated abolishment. They proposed that the loyal slaveholders of the border accept pay for their human property before emancipation by force was applied to the Confederate States. They looked to Missouri to pioneer the way.

As early as his message to Congress on December 3, 1861, the President said the government must use all indispensable means to maintain the Union. He hinted at colonization as a possible remedy for slavery.

On the 6th of March he sent to Congress a message recommending pay for slaves of the loyal. He wrote private letters urging the initiation of emancipation legislation. "I say 'initiation,'" he wrote, "because in my judgment gradual and not sudden emancipation is better for all."

On the 10th of March, he invited the Missourians and the other Members of Congress from border States to the White House for a conference and presented his plan for gradual compensated abolishment. Only two of the Missourians favored the plan. They were Senator John B. Henderson and Representative John W. Noell. Frank Blair, who was for the plan, was not there. Subsequently he wrote a letter on the policy to Rudolph Doehn of Missouri in which he declared himself for a "gradual, peaceful and just measure of emancipation."

After the March conference the President urged his views upon the Members of Congress individually. He chose Senator Henderson to champion the pay-for-slaves policy. Blair was in the field with his command. Henderson had entered the Senate by appointment from Governor Gamble, taking the place of Truett Polk who had gone into the Confederate army. Henderson was then but little beyond the age which made him eligible for the Senate. The President took him into his confidence. Some years ago, in Washington, Senator Henderson gave the writer his recollections. There was great pressure being brought to bear upon the President to declare general emancipation. Delegations of ministers were coming to Washington and demanding the freedom of the slaves. The leaders of the Republican party were insistent. Senator Zach. Chandler of Michigan, Senator Ben Wade of Ohio and Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts called almost daily at the White House to tell the President what he ought to do. Senator

Henderson was sent for frequently to report how the border States policy was progressing.

"As I went in one day," Senator Henderson said, "I noticed that the President looked troubled. He was sitting in one of his favorite attitudes—in a rocking chair with one leg thrown over the arm. I knew that he suffered terribly from headaches, and I said:

" 'Mr. President, you must have one of your headaches; you look so gloomy.'

" 'No,' said he, 'it isn't headache this time. Chandler has been here to talk again about emancipation, and he came on the heels of Wade and Sumner, who were here on the same errand. I like these three men, but they bother me nearly to death. They put me in the situation of a boy I remember when I was going to school.' "

Senator Henderson noted the brightening of Mr. Lincoln's face. He recognized the signs that a story was coming. Mr. Lincoln leaned forward, began to smile, and clasped his hands around the knee of the leg resting on the arm of the chair.

"The text-book was the Bible," Mr. Lincoln went on. "There was a rather dull little fellow in the class who didn't know very much. We were reading the account of the three Hebrews cast into the fiery furnace. The little fellow was called on to read and he stumbled along until he came to the names of the three Hebrews—Shadrach, Meshach and Abednego. He couldn't do anything with them. The teacher pronounced them over very slowly and told the boy to try. The boy tried and missed. This provoked the teacher and he slapped the little fellow, who cried vigorously. Then the boy tried again but he couldn't get the names. 'Well,' said the teacher impatiently, 'never mind the names. Skip them and go on.' The poor boy drew his shirt sleeve across his eyes two or three times, snuffed his nose and started on to read. He went along bravely a little way, and then he suddenly stopped, dropped the book down in front of him, looked despairingly at the teacher and burst out crying. 'What's the matter now?' shouted the teacher, all out of patience. 'H-h-here's them same darn three fellers agin,' sobbed the boy.

"That," said the President, "is just my fix today, Henderson. Those same darn three fellers have been here again with their everlasting emancipation talk."

The President stopped a few moments to enjoy the story, and becoming serious, continued:

"But Sumner and Wade and Chandler are right about it. I know it and you know it, too. I've got to do something and it can't be put off much longer. We can't get through this terrible war with slavery existing. You've got sense enough to know that.

Why can't you make the border States members see it? Why don't you turn in and take pay for your slaves from the government? Then all your people can give their hearty support to the Union. We can go ahead with emancipation of slaves by proclamation in the other States and end the trouble."

As early as May, 1862, the President told Senator Henderson of his intention to issue the emancipation proclamation. Action was not taken until six months later and then it was not to take effect until January 1, 1863. The President held out as long as he could, hoping to carry out the border States policy upon which his heart was set. On the 12th of July he again invited the delegation from Missouri and the Members from other States to come to the White House. He read a carefully written appeal to them to adopt his policy of compensated abolishment. He said:

"I intend no reproach or complaint when I assure you that, in my opinion, if you all had voted for the resolution in the gradual emancipation message of last March, the war would now be substantially ended."

Twenty of these Members sent their reply two days later. They pledged their loyalty but declared their judgment to be against the pay-for-slaves policy. The Missourians signing the paper were Senator Robert Wilson and Representatives James S. Rollins, William A. Hall, Thomas L. Price and John S. Phelps.

Senator Henderson and Representative Noell wrote to the President that they would endeavor to secure from the people of Missouri consideration of his plan. They did so. The policy became the issue in the campaign which followed. Of the nine Members of Congress elected by Missouri in November six were avowed emancipationists. The lower branch of the Legislature was emancipation and chose the emancipation candidate for speaker by a vote of sixty-seven to forty-two. Governor Gamble in his message advised the Legislature to take up the subject.

When Congress met in December for the short session the House appointed a select committee on gradual emancipation in the loyal slave-holding States. Frank P. Blair

was made the Missouri member of it. On the 10th of December Senator Henderson introduced in the Senate his bill to give Missouri \$20,000,000 to pay for the slaves of loyal owners. The next day Noell put in his bill in the House, appropriating \$10,000,000 to reimburse loyal owners of slaves in Missouri. Both bills passed by large majorities but the difference in the amounts made it necessary to compromise. The President did all he could to expedite the legislation. On the 10th of January he sent this telegram to General Curtis in command at St. Louis:

"I understand there is considerable trouble with the slaves in Missouri. Please do your best to keep peace on the question for two or three weeks, by which time we hope to do something here towards settling the question in Missouri."

"I do not remember," said Senator Henderson, "whether Mr. Lincoln drafted the bill or I got it up, but the inspiration came from him. I did all in my power to press it. The proposition went through the House and Senate, but it was passed in somewhat different forms. The Senate increased the amount, and this difference had to be adjusted in conference. There was a good majority for the Missouri bill in both branches of Congress and there was not much trouble about compromising the difference of opinions on the amount to be appropriated, but the session was almost at an end and a small minority in the House was able by filibustering and obstructing to prevent the final action there. If the bill could have been brought before the House in its finished form it would have passed finally as easy as it did in the Senate."

"President Lincoln watched the progress of the legislation with a great deal of interest, continued Senator Henderson. "He could not understand why the border States Members should not be for it. And I could not, either. It was perfectly plain to me that slavery had to go. Here was a voluntary offer on the part of the government to compensate the loyal men in the border States for the loss of their property. I talked with the members from Missouri and from Kentucky and with the others who were most interested, but I couldn't make them see it as I did. They had exaggerated ideas of the results which would ensue from a free negro population. They took the position that slavery must not be touched. It was their determined opposition to the end that deferred the bill to give the Missouri slave holders \$20,000,000 for their slaves. If the Missouri bill had gone through the others would have followed undoubtedly and the loyal slaveholders in all of the border States would have received pay for their slaves."

President Lincoln and Senator Henderson were so confident the bill to disburse \$20,000,000 for Missouri slaves would become law that some figuring was done on the amount which would be paid per capita.

"I recollect quite distinctly the calculations I made at the time," Senator Henderson said. "I found that the amount which the government would have distributed to Missourians under the terms of the bill finally agreed upon in conference would have given the loyal owners in my State \$300 for each slave—man, woman and child. That I considered a pretty good price, for while we were legislating the emancipated proclamation had become assured, and it was very evident to my mind that slavery was doomed, even among those slaveholders who had remained loyal."

The record bears out Senator Henderson's recollections. The House passed Noell's bill by seventy-three to forty-six. The Senate accepted the compromise on the amount, which was \$15,000,000 by a vote of twenty-three to fifteen. But the compromise was not reported until six days before the end of the session and a small minority in the House was able to prevent a vote on it. In this minority were three Missourians, William A. Hall, Elijah H. Norton and Thomas L. Price.

To have the courage of their convictions has ever been characteristic of Missourians sent to Congress. The three Missourians who fought the compensated abolishment bill to its death were honest. No one who reads the debate can doubt that. Elijah H. Norton, who represented the Platte district, was one of the leaders of the small opposition minority. He fought the measure from its introduction to the end of the session.

One point which Judge Norton made was that Missouri could not free her slaves without paying the owners the full equivalent for them. He said:

"According to the census of 1860, there were of slaves in Missouri, about 120,000. According to the report of the auditor of the State, founded upon returns made for the year 1862 by the assessors of forty-odd counties, there can not now be less than 100,000 slaves in the State. In my judgment not over 5,000 of them are subject to confiscation under the confiscation law, leaving

95,000 to be bought and paid for. Before the Legislature can emancipate them, they must first pay a full equivalent for them. Not an equivalent which Congress by an arbitrary legislative act fixes; not an equivalent which legislative enactment declares, but the worth, the value of the slave as ascertained from the market rate by a proceeding, not legislative but judicial in its character. I notice sales recently made in Howard County in the district of my colleague at \$900; in other counties at from \$600 to \$700, for negro men. These figures and the former value of slaves lead me to conclude that the average value of slaves in the State would not fall below \$450. Thus, sir, we have the price, being \$450, and the number 95,000 to be bought. The value of these slaves would be \$42,750,000. By this bill you place at the disposal of the Governor \$20,000,000 of bonds; and if the Legislature, out of the state treasury, could also appropriate \$22,750,000, then the Legislature could, in twelve months, pass a valid and constitutional law for the emancipation of slaves according to the terms of the bill. But, sir, this is impossible."

Judge Norton took the position that the general government had no authority to carry out the proposed plan of emancipation. He said:

"The citizens of Missouri are willing to acknowledge their proper and just allegiance to the government of the United States, but they have always held and hold to-day that under the obligations of that allegiance, fixed and defined by the Constitution of the United States, they are not required to give up their state rights and bow down in the dust like serfs and slaves to federal dictation, or the dictation of any one or more States of the Union. Missouri has rights as a State of the Union. Missouri has rights as a State of this Union which you dare not invade without disregarding your oaths and trampling in the dust the Constitution watered with the blood of your Revolutionary sires. You can not abolish our state courts, nor our Legislature; nor can you deprive us of two Senators or our proper number of Representatives upon this floor. You cannot make local laws for our local internal police government conflicting with the reserved rights of the State and the people. While you can not do any of these things, either directly or indirectly, neither can you by direction or indirection, as you propose by this bill, abolish slavery. That is as much their concern as is the election of their Legislature. The people of that State are a brave, magnanimous, patriotic and just-minded people; and whenever in the exercise of their virtues they determine that it is for their interest and to the interest of the State and country generally that the institution of slavery should be abolished in a legal

and constitutional mode, all citizens of the State will agree to their verdict and sanction their action. You do not propose to have it accomplished in this way, but are for stepping in and settling the matter at once."

In conclusion Judge Norton pictured the horrors as he foresaw them of a free negro population in Missouri:

"Under this bill you propose to turn adrift upon the people of the State 100,000 persons without a dollar, without homes or provision made for them to get homes, persons of all ages, sexes and conditions, the old and infirm, the halt, lame and blind, the young and defenseless, in one promiscuous mass. Is this humanity? Humanitarians on the other side of the House may answer. The original bill pledged the faith of this Government to take the emancipated slaves out of the State; the substitute adopted by the Senate, and now here for action, strikes this provision out, thus converting Missouri into a free negro State. You can not inflict a greater injury on Missouri than thus to fill up her communities with this kind of worthless population. A free negro population is the greatest curse to any country."

#### SCHOFIELD AND MISSOURI.

The first day of January, 1863, was one of the most momentous in the administration of President Lincoln. That day, after receiving the suggestions of his cabinet and after much consideration as to form and effect of what he was about to do, the President signed the Emancipation Proclamation. The next day he took up and, as he evidently supposed, solved a Missouri problem. This was the Pine Street Presbyterian church controversy. The Rev. Dr. McPheeters had baptized a little Missouri baby with the name of Sterling Price. This was one of the charges made against Dr. McPheeters by some members of his congregation who admitted his piety but questioned his loyalty. The charges were laid before the provost marshal. That functionary ordered the arrest of the divine and took charge of the church, relieving the trustees. The issue was carried to the White House, as was the custom, and the President, turning from weighty matters, wrote to General Curtis, commanding at St. Louis:



"The United States must not, as by this order, undertake to run the churches. When an individual in a church, or out of it, becomes dangerous to the public interest he must be checked; but let the churches, as such, take care of themselves."

Doubtless Mr. Lincoln thought he had laid down a broad principle that would relieve him of further appeals from either party to the Pine Street Presbyterian church differences. Dr. McPheeters was discharged from arrest. The President was immediately asked to restore to Dr. McPheeters his ecclesiastical rights. His reply was addressed to O. D. Filley, the head of the St. Louis Committee of Public Safety.

"I have never interfered," Mr. Lincoln wrote, "nor thought of interfering, as to who shall, or shall not, preach in any church; nor have I knowingly or believingly tolerated any one to so interfere by my authority. If, after all, what is now sought is to have me put Dr. McPheeters back over the heads of a majority of his own congregation, that, too, will be declined. I will not have control of any church, on any side."

Individual, as well as church and state problems in Missouri, were put up to Mr. Lincoln. On the 7th of January, the same week that the President had, as he thought, disposed of the Pine Street Presbyterian trouble, he received a message from B. Gratz Brown. The telegram was sent from Jefferson City. The Legislature had assembled. Mr. Brown was a candidate for the United States Senate. He was elected but not until after he had encountered some difficulties. He wired:

"Does the administration desire my defeat; if not, why are its appointees working to that end?"

President Lincoln replied promptly but in language that was diplomatic and perhaps somewhat cryptic:

"Yours of today just received. The administration takes no part between its friends in Missouri, of whom I, at least, consider you one, and I have never before had an

intimation that appointees there were interfering, or were inclined to interfere."

Charcoals and Claybanks the two factions of loyal Missourians were called. Mr. Lincoln tried to be neutral between them. In spirit, if not in so many words, his attitude was, "You all look alike to me." He would not take sides but occasionally he expressed himself vigorously on the unhappy family situation. In the spring of 1863 a Charcoal appeal was made to the President. Mr. Lincoln replied:

"In answer to the within question 'Shall we be sustained by you?' I have to answer that at the beginning of the Administration I appointed one whom I understood to be an editor of the 'Democrat' to be postmaster at St. Louis—the best office in my gift within Missouri. Soon after this, our friends at St. Louis must needs break into factions, the Democrat being, in my opinion, justly chargeable with a full share of the blame for it. I have stoutly tried to keep out of the quarrel, and so mean to do."

President Lincoln continued to preserve strict neutrality between the Missouri factions. Judge S. P. McCurdy, of this State, was a candidate for an appointment. The President, with his own hand, indorsed Judge McCurdy's application:

"This is a good recommendation for a territorial judgeship, embracing both sides in Missouri and many other respectable gentlemen.

A. Lincoln."

The President didn't believe in holding Missourians to strict account for what they might have said in the heat of oratory. Prince L. Hudgins, a lawyer quite well known in the war period, was charged with conspiring against the government. He wrote to President Lincoln explaining that the charge was based on a speech he had made in St. Joseph several months before the law under which he was being prosecuted was enacted. Congressman King went to the White House and recommended a pardon for Hudgins. The President wrote on the papers:

"Attorney General: Please see Mr. King and make out the pardon he asks. Give this man a fair deal if possible."

And then, perhaps after a little more conversation with the Missouri Congressman, Mr. Lincoln added this to his indorsement:

"Gov. King leaves Saturday evening and would want to have it with him to take along, if possible. Would wish it made out as soon as conveniently can be."

Grant, Sherman and Sheridan served in Missouri. These three generals, who afterwards were advanced to the highest military positions, saw their earliest war service in this State. President Lincoln came to have the greatest confidence in them. He placed his dependence upon them for ultimate success of the Union armies in the closing year. Who can tell in what measure the recognition of these three generals was in the end due to the intimate and anxious interest with which Mr. Lincoln followed those early developments in Missouri! The Secretary of War was of Pennsylvania. War department influences were eastern. "On to Richmond!" was the cry of the Atlantic seaboard. But President Lincoln, with his mind on the situation in Missouri, took a different view. He hardly waited until Price's army had left the State before setting in motion the Mississippi river campaign, starting from Missouri. He wanted to cut the Confederacy in two by way of the river and prevent food supplies from the southwest reaching the cotton States. Montgomery Blair, after the death of Mr. Lincoln, gave this among other reminiscences:

"One day in cabinet meeting, Lincoln turned to the Secretary of War and asked, 'Did we not receive a communication sometime last spring from a man named Grant out at Springfield, forwarded by Governor Yates, laying out a plan of campaign down the Mississippi?' The Secretary replied that he believed such a paper had been received. The President requested him to have it looked up, which was done, and it was read in cabinet meeting. It made a strong impression on all its members, Lincoln remarking that at the time it was received it had impressed him favorably, but in the multiplicity of cares it had been forgotten until now, when he had received a communication from Representative Washburne calling

attention to General Grant and suggesting that he be sent to Cairo. Lincoln then said, 'Mr. Secretary, send an order to General Fremont to put Grant in command of the district of Southeast Missouri.' "

Grant went to this new command, he moved to Cairo, took Paducah, fought the battle of Belmont, captured Fort Donelson. The movement down the Mississippi did not progress as loyal Missourians thought it should. Judge Samuel Treat of the federal court at St. Louis wrote to Judge Davis, presenting the importance of the Mississippi river campaign as it appeared to him. He received in reply a letter from President Lincoln, the original of which is preserved by the Missouri Historical Society:

Private.

Executive Mansion,  
Washington, Nov. 19, 1862.

Judge S. Treat,  
St. Louis, Mo.

My dear sir:

Your very patriotic and judicious letter, addressed to Judge Davis, in relation to the Mississippi, has been left with me for perusal. You do not estimate the value of the object you press more highly than it is estimated here. It is now the object of particular attention. It has not been neglected, as you seem to think, because the West was divided into different military districts. The cause is much deeper. The country will not allow us to send our whole western force down the Mississippi, while the enemy sacks Louisville and Cincinnati. Probably it would be better if the country would allow this, but it will not. I confidently believed last September that we could end the war by allowing the enemy to go to Harrisburg and Philadelphia, only that we could not keep down mutiny, and utter demoralization among the Pennsylvanians. And this, though unhandy sometimes, is not at all strange. I presume if an army was starting to-day for New Orleans, and you confidently believed that St. Louis would be sacked in consequence, you would be in favor of stopping such army.

We are compelled to watch all these things.

With great respect

Your obt. servant,

A. Lincoln.

## THE MISSOURI COMMITTEE OF SEVENTY.

After Fremont came in succession Hunter, Halleck, Curtis and Schofield as military commanders to deal with the confusing situation in Missouri. In 1862 there was issued by the general then commanding an order "to assess and collect without unnecessary delay the sum of \$500,000 from the secessionists and southern sympathizers" of the city and county of St. Louis. The order stated that the money was to be "used in subsisting, clothing and arming the enrolled militia while in active service, and in providing for the support of the families of such militiamen and United States volunteers as may be destitute." The assessment was begun. Collections were enforced by the military. Rev. Dr. William G. Eliot, founder of Washington University, wrote a memorial that the assessment was "working evil in this community and doing great harm to the Union cause. Among our citizens are all shades of opinion, from that kind of neutrality which is hatred in disguise, through all the grades of lukewarmness, 'sympathy' and hesitating zeal up to the full loyalty which your memorialists claim to possess. To assort and classify them, so as to indicate the dividing line of loyalty and disloyalty, and to establish the rates of payment by those falling below it is a task of great difficulty."

Reviewing the assessment as far as it had progressed, Dr. Eliot continued: "The natural consequence has been that many feel themselves aggrieved, not having supposed themselves liable to a suspicion of disloyalty; many escape assessment who, if any, deserve it; and a general feeling of inequality in the rule and ratio of assessments prevails. This was unavoidable for no two tribunals could agree upon the details of such an assessment either as to the persons or amounts to be assessed without more complete knowledge of facts than are to be attained from ex-parte testimony and current reports."

The memorial was sent to President Lincoln. Very promptly came the order from Washington:

"As there seems to be no present military necessity for the enforcement of this assessment, all proceedings under the order will be suspended."

But the assessment policy was continued in the interior of the State. One of the orders called for an assessment of \$5,000 for every Union soldier or Union citizen killed and \$1,000 for every Union soldier or Union citizen wounded by the bushwhackers or guerilla bands. The President wrote to General Curtis one of his friendly letters on the Missouri situation and suggested that he stop these assessments. General Curtis wrote at considerable length in reply. He told how the assessment policy had begun under the provost marshal system started by Fremont and continued by Halleck and by himself. He argued in favor of its continuance. Then by general order the President suspended these assessments in Missouri.

In March the quarrel between the factions had reached such a stage that the President relieved General Curtis. Missourians calling at the White House found in the President's welcome a note of weariness as he referred to his efforts to keep peace between the discordant elements. One of these visitors returning to St. Louis quoted the President as saying:

"The dissensions between Union men in Missouri are due solely to a factious spirit, which is exceedingly reprehensible. The two parties ought to have their heads knocked together."

The President appointed General Schofield to the command in Missouri and on the 27th of May wrote him this letter for guidance:

"Having relieved General Curtis and assigned you to the command of the Department of Missouri, I think it may be some advantage for me to state to you why I did it. I did not relieve General Curtis because of any full conviction that he had done wrong by commission or omission. I did it because of a conviction in my mind that the Union men of Missouri, constituting when united, a vast majority of the whole people, have entered into a pestilent factional quarrel among themselves—General Curtis, perhaps not from choice, being the head of one faction, and Governor Gamble that of the other. After months of labor to reconcile the

difficulty, it seemed to grow worse and worse, until I felt it my duty to break it up somehow; and as I could not remove Governor Gamble, I had to remove General Curtis. Now that you are in the position, I wish you to undo nothing merely because General Curtis or Governor Gamble did it, but to exercise your own judgment and do right for the public interest.

"Let your military measures be strong enough to repel the invader and to keep the peace, and not so strong as to unnecessarily harass and persecute the people. It is a difficult role, and so much greater will be the honor if you perform it well. If both factions, or neither, shall abuse you, you will probably be about right. Beware of being assailed by one and praised by the other.

Yours truly,

A Lincoln."

The Schofield letter became public,—“surreptitiously” the President subsequently explained. It prompted Governor Gamble to write, complaining of the reference to him as heading one of the parties to a “pestilent factional quarrel.” Mr. Lincoln replied acknowledging the receipt of the letter and saying he had not read it and did not intend to read it.

On the last day of September, 1863, came a crisis in the relationship of Lincoln and Missouri. At nine o'clock in the morning, the President came into the great east room of the White House. Awaiting him were seventy “Radical Union men of Missouri.” They had accepted that designation. They had been chosen at a mass convention,—“the largest mass convention ever held in the State,” their credentials said. That convention had appointed these seventy Missourians to proceed to Washington and “to procure a change in the governmental policy in reference to Missouri.”

#### LINCOLN'S REPLY TO THE COMMITTEE.

This meant more than a state movement. It had taken on the voice of the radical anti-slavery elements of the whole country, speaking through Missouri. It demanded that President Lincoln now commit himself to universal abolition of slavery and to the general use of negro troops against the Confederate armies. It was the uprising of those who thought Mr. Lincoln's administration too mild. The President understood well what the coming of the delegation meant. One

who was there said that when Mr. Lincoln came into the room "he bore the appearance of being much depressed, as if the matters at issue in the conference which was impending were of great anxiety and trouble to him." The Missourians were realizing the national scope of their mission. On the way to Washington they had stopped at several places and had received enthusiastic encouragement from the abolitionists. They had been urged to stand firm on the platform that slavery by the loyal owners in the border States must be wiped out, and that without compensation. On their arrival in Washington the seventy had drawn up an address to the President and had put into it this declaration:

We rejoice that in your proclamation of January 1, 1863, you laid the mighty hand of the nation upon that gigantic enemy of American liberty, and we and our constituents honor you for that wise and noble act. We and they hold that that proclamation did, in law, by its own force, liberate every slave in the region it covered; that it is irrevocable, and that from the moment of its issue the American people stood in an impregnable position before the world and the rebellion received its death blow. If you, Mr. President, felt that duty to your country demanded that you should unshackle the slaves of the rebel States in an hour, we see no earthly reason why the people of Missouri should not, from the same sense of duty, strike down with equal suddenness the traitorous and parricidal institution in their midst.

This was the essence of the Missouri movement which gave it national interest, which prompted the grand chorus of approval from the anti-slavery people of the North. It led to the series of indorsing ovations, concluding with the chief demonstration in Cooper Institute, New York City, where the seventy Missourians were welcomed by William Cullen Bryant.

There were events and conditions, apart from what was going on in Missouri, which added to the importance of this conference between Mr. Lincoln and the seventy. The week before the delegation started from St. Louis for Washington, that bloodiest battle, Chickamauga, was fought. The whole North was depressed by the narrow escape of Rosecrans' army. When the Missourians arrived in Washington,



Hooker's army was marching all night over the Long Bridge out of Virginia and into the capital to take trains for the roundabout journey to Chattanooga, that these troops might re-enforce those penned and save them from being forced north of the Tennessee by Bragg. Meade's failure to follow up the success at Gettysburg in July previous had given dissatisfaction. There was division in the cabinet over administration policies. The Presidential campaign would come on in a few months. Perhaps, at no other time since the beginning of the war had President Lincoln faced more discouraging criticism and hostile opinion. And now came these Missourians to add to the burden.

The address which the seventy had prepared was read to the President. For half an hour, the chairman, Charles D. Drake, read in a deep, sonorous voice, slowly and impressively. The origin and development of antagonism between the Gamble administration and the radical Union men was reviewed at length. The address charged Governor Gamble with the intention to preserve slavery in Missouri and asserted "the Radicals of Missouri desired and demanded the election of a new convention for the purpose of ridding the State of slavery immediately." It dwelt upon the "proslavery character" of Governor Gamble's policy and acts.

"From the antagonisms of the Radicals to such a policy," the address proceeded, "have arisen the conflicts which you, Mr. President, have been pleased heretofore to term a 'factional quarrel. With all respect we deny that the Radicals of Missouri have been, or are in any sense, a party to any such quarrel. We are no factionists; but men earnestly intent upon doing our part toward rescuing this great nation from the assaults which slavery is aiming at its life." This reference in the address was to the personal letter from the President to General Schofield.

The climax was reached when these "seventy radical Union men" submitted their request that Ben Butler, whose drastic measures toward the South were causing much talk, be sent to succeed Schofield:

We ask, further, Mr. President, that in the place of General Schofield a department commander be assigned to the Department of Missouri whose sympathies will be with Missouri's loyal and suffering people, and not with slavery and proslavery men. General Schofield has disappointed our just expectations by identifying himself with our state administration, and his policy as department commander has been, as we believe, shaped to conform to Governor Gamble's proslavery and conservative views. He has subordinated federal authority in Missouri to state rule. He has become a party to the enforcement of conscription into the state service. He has countenanced, if not sustained, the orders issued from the state headquarters, prohibiting enlistments from the enrolled militia into the volunteer service of the United States. Officers acting under him have arbitrarily arrested and imprisoned loyal citizens, without assigned cause, or for daring to censure Governor Gamble's policy and acts. Other such officers have ordered loyal men to be disarmed, and in some instances the order has been executed, while, under the pretense of preventing an invasion of Missouri from Kansas, notorious and avowed disloyalists have been armed. He has issued a military order prohibiting the liberty of speech and of the press. An officer in charge of negro recruits that had been enlisted under lawful authority, as we are informed and believe, was on the 20th inst. arrested in Missouri by Brigadier General Guitar, acting under General Schofield's orders, his commission, sidearms and recruits taken from him, and he imprisoned and sent out of the State. And, finally, we declare to you, Mr. President, that from the day of General Schofield's accession to the command of that department, matters have grown worse and worse in Missouri, till now they are in a more terrible condition than they have been at any time since the outbreak of the rebellion. This could not be if General Schofield had administered the affairs of that department with proper vigor and with a resolute purpose to sustain loyalty and suppress disloyalty. We, therefore, respectfully pray you to send another general to command that department; and, if we do not overstep the bounds of propriety, we ask that the commander sent there be Major General Benjamin F. Butler. We believe that his presence there would restore order and peace to Missouri in less than sixty days.

The closing paragraph of the address was calculated to impress Mr. Lincoln with the intensity of feeling prompting the delegation. Perhaps in the history of White House conferences such strong language was never before used by citizens to place personal responsibility upon a President:

Whether the loyal hearts of Missouri shall be crushed is for you to say. If you refuse our requests, we return to our homes only to witness, in consequence of that refusal, a more active and relentless persecution of Union men, and to feel that while Maryland can rejoice in the protection of the government of the Union, Missouri is still to be a victim of proslavery conservatism, which blasts wherever it reigns. Does Missouri deserve such a fate? What border slave State confronted the rebellion in its first spring as she did? Remember, we pray you, who it was that in May, 1861, captured Camp Jackson and saved the arsenal at St. Louis from the hands of traitors, and the Union cause in the Valley of the Mississippi from incalculable disaster. Remember the Home Guards, who sprung to arms in Missouri when the government was without troops or means to defend itself there. Remember the more than 50,000 volunteers that Missouri has sent forth to battle for the Union. Remember that, although always a slave State, her unconditional loyalty to the Union shines lustrously before the whole nation. Recall to memory these things, Mr. President, and let them exert their just influence upon your mind. We ask only justice and protection to our suffering people. If they are to suffer hereafter, as now, and in time past, the world will remember that they are not responsible for the gloomy page in Missouri's history, which may have to record the independent efforts of her harassed but still loyal men to defend themselves, their families and their homes against their disloyal and murderous assailants.

The names of the seventy were signed to this remarkable document. Charles D. Drake signed first, as chairman. He was afterwards a Senator from Missouri and still later was chief justice of the court of claims at Washington. Two Missouri Congressmen, Ben Loan and J. W. McClurg, the latter afterwards Governor, signed as vice-chairmen of the delegation. One of the secretaries was Emil Preetorius of the St. Louis Westliche Post. One of the seventy was Enos Clarke of Kirkwood. With some reluctance Mr. Clarke talked recently of this historic occasion, prefacing that it is difficult for those who did not live through those trying times in Missouri to appreciate the conditions which prevailed.

"The feeling over our grievances had become intense," he said. "We represented the extreme anti-slavery sentiment. We were the Republicans who had been in accord with Fremont's position on slavery. Both sides of the controversy had repeatedly presented their views to Mr. Lincoln, but this delegation of seventy

was the most imposing and most formal protest which had been made against the Gamble state government and against the national administration's policy in Missouri. The attention of the whole country, it seemed, had been drawn to this Missouri issue."

"Who was the author of the address, Mr. Clarke?"

"The address was the result of several meetings we held after we reached Washington. We were there nearly a week. Arriving on Saturday, we did not have our conference at the White House until Wednesday. Every day we met in Willard's Hall, on F street, and considered the address. Mr. Drake would read over a few paragraphs, and we would discuss them. At the close of the meeting Mr. Drake would say, 'I will call you together tomorrow to further consider this matter.' In that way the address progressed to the finish."

"Did the President seem to be much affected by the reading?"

"No. And at the conclusion he began to discuss the address in a manner that was very disappointing to us. He took up one phrase after another and talked about them without showing much interest. In fact, he seemed inclined to treat many of the matters contained in the paper as of little importance. The things which we had felt to be so serious Mr. Lincoln treated as really unworthy of much consideration. That was the tone in which he talked at first. He minimized what seemed to us most important."

"Did he indulge in any story or humorous comment?"

"No. There was nothing that seemed like levity at that stage of the conference. On the contrary, the President was almost impatient, as if he wished to get through with something disagreeable. When he had expressed the opinion that things were not so serious as we thought he began to ask questions, many of them. He elicited answers from different members of the delegation. He started argument, parrying some of the opinions expressed by us and advancing opinions contrary to the conclusions of our Committee of Seventy. This treatment of our grievances was carried so far that most of us felt a sense of deep chagrin. But after continuing in this line for some time the President's whole manner underwent change. It seemed as if he had been intent upon drawing us out. When satisfied that he fully understood us and had measured the strength of our purpose, the depth of our feeling, he took up the address as if new. He handled the various grievances in a most serious manner. He gave us the impression that he was disposed to regard them with as much concern as we did. After a while the conversation became colloquial between the President and the members of the delegation—more informal and more sympathetic. The change of tone made us feel that we were going to get consideration."

"Did the President make any reference to that part of the address about the 'factional quarrel'?" "



"Yes, he did. And it was about the only thing he said that had a touch of humor in that long conversation. In the course of his reply to us he took up that grievance. 'Why,' he said, 'you are a long way behind the times in complaining of what I said upon that point. Governor Gamble was ahead of you. There came to me some time ago a letter complaining because I had said that he was a party to a factional quarrel, and I answered that letter without reading it.' The features of the president took on a whimsical look as he continued: 'Maybe you would like to know how I could answer it without reading it. Well, I'll tell you. My private secretary told me such a letter had been received and I sat down and wrote to Governor Gamble in about these words: 'I understand that a letter has been received from you complaining that I said you were a party to a factional quarrel in Missouri. I have not read that letter, and, what is more, I never will.' With that Mr. Lincoln dismissed our grievance about having been called parties to a factional quarrel. He left us to draw our own inference from what he said, as he had left Governor Gamble to construe the letter without help.'"

"Did the conference progress to satisfactory conclusions after the President's manner changed?"

"We did not receive specific promises, but I think we felt much better toward the close than we had felt in the first hour. The President spoke generally of his purposes rather than with reference to conditions in Missouri. Toward the close of the conference he went on to speak of his great office, of its burdens, of its responsibilities and duties. Among other things he said that in the administration of the government he wanted to be the President of the whole people and no section. He thought we, possibly, failed to comprehend the enormous stress that rested upon him. 'It is my ambition and desire,' he said with considerable feeling, 'to so administer the affairs of the government while I remain President that if at the end I shall have lost every other friend on earth I shall at least have one friend remaining and that one shall be down inside of me.'"

"How long did the conference continue?"

"Three hours. It was nearing noon when the President said what I have just quoted. That seemed to be the signal to end the conference. Mr. Drake stepped forward and addressing the President, who was standing, said, with deliberation and emphasis: 'The hour has come when we can no longer trespass upon your attention. Having submitted to you in a formal way a statement of our grievances, we will take leave of you, asking the privilege that each member of the delegation may take you by the hand. But, in taking leave of you, Mr. President, let me say to you many of these

gentlemen return to a border State filled with disloyal sentiment. If upon their return there the military policies of your administration shall subject them to risk of life in the defense of the government and their blood shall be shed—let me tell you, Mr. President, that their blood shall be upon your garments and not upon ours.' ”

“How did the President receive that?”

“With great emotion. Tears trickled down his face, as we filed by shaking his hand.”

In an old scrapbook kept by Enos Clark in the war and reconstruction period is preserved the reply of Mr. Lincoln to the “seventy radical Union men of Missouri.” On the evening of the day that the seventy were at the White House they were given a reception by the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Chase. This was considered significant. At that time there was much talk of Chase for the Presidential nomination by the radical opposition to Mr. Lincoln. The Secretary was alleged to be intriguing for the nomination.

From Washington the seventy Missourians went to New York City to be honored by the anti-slavery people at a great mass meeting in Cooper Institute. Charles P. Johnson was the orator chosen by the Missourians to reply to the welcome.

On the 5th of October, only five days after he received the Missourians, the President sent his reply. There are few letters by Mr. Lincoln as long as this one on the Missouri situation. The analysis of causes and conditions in this State, when the war was half over, has no equal in print. It showed complete comprehension of the troubles and suggested common sense remedies. It is a revelation of Mr. Lincoln's clear vision in the midst of the most conflicting and confusing reports. This letter, in its entirety, deserves prominent place in the war period of the history of Missouri:

Executive Mansion,  
Washington, October 5, 1863.

Hon. Charles D. Drake and others, Committee:

Gentlemen: Your original address, presented on the 30th ultimo, and the four supplementary ones presented on the 3rd instant, have been carefully considered. I hope you will regard the other duties claiming my attention, together with the great length and importance of these documents, as constituting a suffi-

cient apology for my not having responded sooner. These papers, framed for a common object, consist of things demanded, and the reasons for demanding them. The things demanded are—

First. That General Schofield shall be relieved, and General Butler be appointed as commander of the Military Department of Missouri;

Second. That the system of Enrolled Militia in Missouri may be broken up, and national forces substituted for it, and

Third. That at elections, persons may not be allowed to vote who are not entitled by law to do so.

Among the reasons given, enough of suffering and wrong to Union men is certainly, and I suppose, truly stated. Yet the whole case presented fails to convince me that General Schofield, or the Enrolled Militia, is responsible for that suffering and wrong. The whole can be explained on a more charitable, and, I think, a more rational hypothesis.

We are in civil war. In such cases there always is a main question, but in this case that question is a perplexing compound—Union and slavery. It thus becomes a question not of two sides merely, but of at least four sides, even among those who are for the Union, saying nothing of those who are against it. Thus those who are for the Union with but not without slavery; those for it without but not with; those for it with or without but prefer it with; those for it with or without but prefer it without. Among these, again, is a subdivision of those who are for gradual but not for immediate, and those who are for immediate, but not for gradual, extinction of slavery.

It is easy to conceive that all these shades of opinion, and even more, may be sincerely entertained by honest and truthful men. Yet all being for the Union, by reason of these differences each will prefer a different way of sustaining the Union. At once sincerity is questioned and motives assailed. Actual war coming, blood grows hot and blood is spilled. Thought is forced from old channels into confusion. Deception breeds and thrives. Confidence dies, and universal suspicion reigns. Each man feels an impulse to kill his neighbor lest he be killed by him. Revenge and retaliation follow. And all this, as before said, may be among honest men only. But this is not all. Every foul bird comes abroad and every dirty reptile rises up. These add crime to confusion. Strong measures, deemed indispensable but harsh at best, such men make worse by maladministration. Murders for old grudges and murders for pelf proceed under any cloak that will best cover for the occasion. These causes amply account for what has occurred in Missouri, without ascribing it to the weakness or wickedness of any general.

The newspaper files, those chroniclers of current events, will show the evils now complained of were as prevalent under Fremont,

Hunter, Halleck and Curtis, as under Schofield. If the former had greater force opposed to them, they also had greater force with which to meet it. When the organized army left the State, the main federal force had to go also, leaving the department commander at home, relatively, no stronger than before. Without disparaging any, I affirm with confidence, that no commander of that department has, in proportion to his means, done better than General Schofield.

The first specific charge against General Schofield is, that the Enrolled Militia was placed under his command, whereas it had not been placed under the command of General Curtis. The fact I believe is true; but you do not point out, nor can I conceive how that did, or could injure loyal men, or the Union cause.

You charge that upon General Curtis being superseded by General Schofield, Franklin A. Dick was superseded by James O. Broadhead as provost marshal general. No very specific showing is made as to how this did or could injure the Union cause. It recalls, however, the conditions of things, as presented to me, which led to a change of commander for that department.

To restrain contraband intelligence and trade, a system of searches, seizures, permits, and passes had been introduced, I think, by General Fremont. When General Halleck came, he found and continued this system, and added an order, applicable to some parts of the State, to levy and collect contributions from noted rebels to compensate losses, and relieve destitution, caused by the rebellion. The action of General Fremont and General Halleck, as stated, constituted a sort of a system, which General Curtis found in full operation when he took command of the department. That there was a necessity for something of the sort was clear; but that it could only be justified by stern necessity, and that it was liable to great abuse in administration was equally clear. Agents to execute it, contrary to the great Prayer, were led into temptation. Some might, while others would not, resist that temptation. It was not possible to hold any to a very strict accountability; and those yielding to the temptation would sell permits and passes to those who would pay most, and most readily for them; and would seize property, and collect levies in the aptest way to fill their own pockets. Money being the object, the man having money, whether loyal or disloyal, would be a victim. This practice doubtless existed to some extent, and it was a real additional evil that it could be, and was plausibly, charged to exist in a greater extent than it did.

When General Curtis took command of the department, Mr. Dick, against whom I never knew anything to allege, had general charge of this system. A controversy in regard to it rapidly grew into almost unmanageable proportions. One side ignored the necessity and magnified the evils of the system, while the other



ignored the evils and magnified the necessity; and each bitterly assailed the motives of the other.

I could not fail to see that the controversy enlarged in the same proportion as the professed Union men there distinctly took sides in two opposing political parties. I exhausted my wits, and very nearly my patience also, in efforts to convince both that the evils they charged on each other were inherent in the case, and could not be cured by giving either party a victory over the other.

Plainly the irritating system was not to be perpetual, and it was plausibly urged that it could be modified at once with advantage. The case could scarcely be worse, and whether it could be made better could only be determined by trial. In this view, and not to ban or brand General Curtis, or to give a victory to any party, I made the change of commander for the department. I now learn that soon after this change Mr. Dick was removed and that Mr. Broadhead, a gentleman of no less good character, was put in the place. The mere fact of this change is more distinctly complained of than is any conduct of the new officer, or other consequences of the change.

I gave the new commander no instructions as to the administration of the system mentioned, beyond what is contained in the private letter, afterwards surreptitiously published, in which I directed him to act solely for the public good, and independently of both parties. Neither anything you have presented me, nor anything I have otherwise learned, has convinced me that he has been unfaithful to this charge.

Imbecility is urged as one cause for removing General Schofield, and the late massacre at Lawrence, Kansas, is passed as evidence of that imbecility. To my mind, that fact scarcely tends to prove the proposition. That massacre is only an example of what Grier-son, John Morgan, and many others might have repeatedly done on their respective raids had they chose to incur the personal hazard, and possessed the fiendish heart to do it.

The charge is made that General Schofield, on purpose to protect the Lawrence murderers, would not allow them to be pursued into Missouri. While no punishment could be too sudden, or too severe for those murderers, I am well satisfied that the preventing of the threatened remedial raid into Missouri was the only safe way to avoid an indiscriminate massacre there, including probably more innocent than guilty. Instead of condemning, I, therefore, approve what I understand General Schofield did in that respect.

The charges that General Schofield has purposely withheld protection from loyal people, and purposely facilitated the objects of the disloyal are altogether beyond my power of belief. I do not arraign the veracity of gentlemen as to the facts complained of; but I do more than question the judgment which would infer that

those facts occurred in accordance with the purpose of General Schofield.

With my present views, I must decline to remove General Schofield. In this I decide nothing against General Butler. I sincerely wish it were convenient to assign him to a suitable command.

In order to meet some existing evils, I have addressed a letter of instruction to General Schofield, a copy of which I enclose to you. As to the Enrolled Militia, I shall endeavor to ascertain better than I now know, what is its exact value. Let me say now, however, that your proposal to substitute national force for the Enrolled Militia implies that in your judgment the latter is doing something which needs to be done; and, if so, the proposition to throw that force away, and to supply its place by bringing other forces from the field where they are urgently needed, seems to me very extraordinary. Whence shall they come? Shall they be drawn from Banks, or Grant, or Steele, or Rosecrans?

Few things have been so grateful to my anxious feeling, as when, in June last, the local force in Missouri aided General Schofield to so promptly send a large general force to the relief of General Grant, then investing Vicksburg, and menaced from without by General Johnston. Was this all wrong? Should the Enrolled Militia then have been broken up, and General Heron kept from Grant, to police Missouri? So far from finding cause to object, I confess to a sympathy for whatever relieves our general force in Missouri, and allows it to serve elsewhere.

I, therefore, as at present advised, cannot attempt the destruction of the Enrolled Militia of Missouri. I may add, that the force being under the national military control, it is also within the proclamation with regard to the habeas corpus.

I concur in the propriety of your request in regard to elections, and have, as you see, directed General Schofield accordingly. I do not feel justified to enter the broad field you present in regard to the political differences between Radicals and Conservatives. From time to time I have done and said what appeared to me proper to do and say. The public knows it well. It obliges nobody to follow me, and I trust it obliges me to follow nobody.

The Radicals and Conservatives each agree with me in some things and disagree in others. I could wish both to agree with me in all things; for then they would agree with each other, and would be too strong for any foe from any quarter. They, however, choose to do otherwise, and I do not question their rights. I hold whoever commands in Missouri, or elsewhere, responsible to me, and not to either Radicals or Conservatives. It is my duty to hear all; but,

at last, I must, within my sphere, judge what to do and what to forbear.

Your obedient servant,

A. Lincoln.

Mr. Lincoln enclosed in this long letter to the committee a copy of the instructions to General Schofield as the result of the address of the Missourians.

(Copy.)

Executive Mansion,  
Washington, D. C., Oct. 1, 1863.

General John M. Schofield:

There is no organized military force in avowed opposition to the general government now in Missouri; and if any such shall reappear, your duty in regard to it will be too plain to require any special instruction. Still, the condition of things, both there and elsewhere, is such as to render it indispensable to maintain, for a time, the United States military establishment in that State, as well as to rely upon it for a fair contribution of support to that establishment generally. Your immediate duty in regard to Missouri now is to advance the efficiency of that establishment, and to so use it, as far as practicable, to compel the excited people there to leave one another alone.

Under your recent order, which I have approved, you will only arrest individuals, and suppress assemblies or newspapers, when they may be working palpable injury (Mr. Lincoln underscored the word palpable) to the military in your charge; and in no other case will you interfere with the expression of opinion in any form, or allow it to be interfered with violently by others. In this you have a discretion to exercise with great caution, calmness and forbearance.

With the matters of removing the inhabitants of certain counties en masse, and of removing certain individuals from time to time, who are supposed to be mischievous, I am not now interfering, but am leaving to your discretion.

Nor am I interfering with what may still seem to you to be necessary restrictions upon trade and intercourse. I think proper, however, to enjoin upon you the following: Allow no part of the military under your command to be engaged in either returning fugitive slaves, or in forcing or enticing slaves from their homes; and so far as practicable, enforce the same forbearance upon the people.

Report to me your opinion upon the availability for good of the Enrolled Militia of the State. Allow no one to enlist colored troops, except upon orders from you, or from here through you. Allow no one to assume the functions of confiscating property,

under the law of Congress, or otherwise, except upon orders from here.

At elections, see that those, and only those, are allowed to vote, who are entitled to do so by the laws of Missouri, including as of those laws the restrictions laid by the Missouri Convention upon those who may have participated in the rebellion.

So far as practicable, you will, by means of your military force, expel guerrillas, marauders and murderers, and all who are known to harbor or abet them. But in like manner you will repress assumptions of unauthorized individuals to perform the same service, because under pretence of doing this they become marauders and murderers themselves.

To now restore peace, let the military obey orders; and those not of the military leave each other alone, thus not breaking the peace themselves.

In giving the above directions, it is not intended to restrain you in other expedient and necessary matters not falling within their range.

Your obedient servant,

A. Lincoln.

#### LINCOLN'S SECOND NOMINATION AND HIS RECONSTRUCTION POLICY.

At this time Frank Blair was fighting Missouri Confederates in the field and Missouri "Jacobins," as he called them, in Congress. In the House Mr. Blair, on the 24th of February, 1864, arraigned Salmon P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury, demanding an investigation. He charged Mr. Chase with intriguing to defeat Mr. Lincoln for a second term. He charged that the Radicals of Missouri, the Jacobins, were in the plot to prevent Mr. Lincoln's renomination. He defended the President's border States policy:

"Things have occurred in Missouri and the other border States not so easily understood by those who come from happier regions, unvisited by the calamities of war. In Missouri, at the outbreak of the war, and for a long time afterwards, the State was a prey to the worst disorders, the country was ravaged and destroyed, and a feeling of bitterness has been engendered which is almost without parallel. Upon this spirit of exasperation, retaliation and revenge the Radicals of my State have undertaken to build up a party. Is this a fit foundation for any party to rest upon? Can peace, prosperity and tranquility be expected from those who act upon such motives? Can any secure or enduring principles of government

be based upon such sentiments? It may be and it is impossible for men to free themselves from the passion of revenge, and the desire for retaliation on those who may have inflicted injuries on them or on their friends and neighbors. It may be utterly impossible to expect that men can free themselves entirely from such influences. But, on the other hand, is it natural, proper, or wise that the President and the great statesmen who are directing the affairs of the government, and whose duty it is to educe peace and good will out of these scenes of anarchy and disorder, should be actuated by the feelings of bitterness which have grown up among the parties to this strife. Such passions are in some degree excusable in those who have suffered injury; but with what face does a man set himself up as a statesman or party leader, who will fan such passions; who will contribute to the public exasperation; who will rekindle these smouldering fires; and who seeks even to drag into them and destroy the Chief Magistrate of the country, when he declines to be the instrument of such malignant passions. Yet this is the position of the Jacobin leaders of Missouri and their confederate Jacobins in Maryland. They appeal to the Union men of other States to support them in their strife in States in which the rebellion has been put down, instead of fighting to put down the rebellion where it still exists. They appeal to the Union men of other States against the President's policy of amnesty, by which the armies of the rebels are being demoralized and depleted, because they desire to glut their vengeance and their lust for spoils. They seek to make a direct issue with the President, to defeat his re-election, in order that they may enjoy the license of another French Revolution under some chief as malignant as themselves."

As early as 1864 there was talk of the reconstruction measures when the war was over. Some were advocating that the freedmen be given the ballot and be armed in large numbers that the franchise might be secured to them. Mr. Blair referred to these propositions. "Can any American citizen find in his heart to inaugurate such a contest?" Mr. Blair asked. And then he outlined the position of the President:

"I prefer Mr. Lincoln's humane, wise, and benevolent policy to secure the peace and happiness of both races; and until that can be accomplished, and while both races are being prepared for this great change, I shall repose in perfect confidence in the promise of the President given in his last message, in which he proposes to remit the control of the freedmen to the restored States, promising to support any provisions which may be adopted by such state

government in relation to the freed people of such State which shall recognize and declare their permanent freedom, provide for their education, and which may yet be consistent as a temporary arrangement with their present condition as a laboring, landless and homeless class.' "

Mr. Blair was right in his forecast of the purpose of the Jacobins to defeat the renomination of Mr. Lincoln. Very shortly after he made the speech in Congress, a call was issued for a national convention to meet in Cleveland in May. Radical Union men of Missouri were active in the movement. Blair's cousin, B. Gratz Brown, was one of the signers of the call. That convention was attended by 350 delegates who did not believe Mr. Lincoln was aggressive enough. Wendell Phillips, the abolitionist, and Fred Douglass, the negro orator, made speeches. Three planks in the very radical platform were:

"That the one-term policy for the Presidency adopted by the people is strengthened by the force of the existing crisis and should be maintained by constitutional amendment.

"That the Constitution should be so amended that the President and Vice-President shall be elected by a direct vote of the people.

"That the confiscation of the lands of the rebels and their distribution among the soldiers and actual settlers is a measure of justice."

The convention nominated General John C. Fremont for President and General John Cochrane for Vice-President. The candidates withdrew in September.

Missourians did all they could to prevent the renomination of Mr. Lincoln. They not only sent a delegation to the Cleveland convention which nominated Fremont but they sent two delegations to the Baltimore convention which renominated Lincoln. The call for the Baltimore convention omitted the name Republican. It designated the assemblage as the "Union National Convention." The two sets of delegates from Missouri to this Baltimore convention contested for the seats with as much vigor as if the nomination depended upon which set got in. It was a foregone

conclusion that Mr. Lincoln would be renominated. He had all of the delegates except those from Missouri. The committee on credentials urged the two delegations from Missouri to patch up their differences and go into the convention with half representation each. The Missourians wouldn't have it so. One delegation was headed by John F. Hume, and had credentials from a Republican state convention. The other set was headed by Congressman Thomas L. Price and had been selected at a meeting held in St. Louis. The convention finally decided that the Hume delegates made the best showing in credentials and seated them.

When Missouri was reached in the call of the roll of States for the Presidential nomination, Mr. Hume got up and said:

"It is a matter of regret that we now differ from the convention which has been so kind to the Radicals of Missouri; but we came here instructed. We represent those who are behind us at home, and we recognize the right of instruction, and we intend to obey our instruction. But in doing so we declare emphatically that we are with the Union party of this nation, and we intend to fight the battle through with it, and assist in carrying its banner to victory in the end, and we will support your nominees, be they whom they may. I will read the resolution adopted by the convention which sent us here:

" 'That we extend our heartfelt thanks to the soldiers of Missouri, who have been, and are now baring their breasts to the storm of battle for the preservation of our free institutions. That we hail them as the practical radicals of the nation whose arguments are invincible, and whose policy for putting down the rebellion is first in importance and effectiveness.'

"Mr. President, in the spirit of that resolution, I cast the twenty-two votes of Missouri for the man who stands at the head of the fighting radicals of the nation, Ulysses S. Grant."

McClurg and Widdicombe were members of the Hume delegation. They represented the Jefferson City district.

Widdicombe was from Boonville. His connection with the Republican party dated back to 1861 when there were only nine Radicals, as they were called, in Boonville, and the nine stumbled up stairs in the dark and met by the light of a tallow candle in a third-story room. In 1887 Mr. Widdicombe gave the writer this account of the part the Missourians took in the Baltimore convention:

"We had caucused and agreed upon our programme but not a word was allowed to slip about it. Lincoln's name was the only one formally presented to the convention, and as the roll was called each State announced its vote for him amid much enthusiasm. At length Missouri was reached. John F. Hume got up and with a few words cast the vote of Missouri for U. S. Grant. Such a storm of disapproval was never started in any convention that I ever attended. Delegates and lookers-on howled and howled. I can remember how I felt. I think my hair stood right up on end. After Hume announced the vote he sat down, and there we were, as solemn and determined as men could look, with the mob all around us demanding that the vote should be changed. I hadn't any doubt for a few moments but what we would be picked up, every man of us, and thrown out into the street.

"Finally, old Jim Lane, of Kansas, got the attention of the convention," continued Mr. Widdicombe. "I suppose they quieted down out of curiosity to know what sort of a fate he would propose for us. Lane went on to say that we were neighbors of his. We had come to the convention with proper credentials, and had been admitted as delegates. That being the case, we had a right to vote for whom we pleased, and it was not Republicanism to try to prevent us. This coming from Jim Lane and Kansas had a good effect. As soon as he sat down Gov. Stone, of Iowa, another good Republican State, jumped up. He was a man more like Sam Cox than anybody I ever saw. He said we were neighbors of his, too, and he didn't like to see us treated that way. He urged the convention to show fair play.

"That partially quieted the storm," Mr. Widdicombe went on, "and the roll call proceeded, but with some grumbling. The last State was reached, and announced its vote as all the others had done, except ours, for Lincoln. Then Mr. Hume got up, before any declaration of the result could be made, and stated that Missouri wished to change her vote from Grant to Lincoln and to move that Mr. Lincoln's nomination be made unanimous. By that time the convention saw what we were up to, and how everybody did shout! After the convention adjourned our delegation came over to Washington and marched up to the White House headed by Gen. John



B. Henderson, who was then in the Senate. Gen. Henderson presented us and Mr. Lincoln got off some funny remarks about our course in the convention. But after we went back home we never had any further occasion to complain about the control of the federal patronage in Missouri so long as Mr. Lincoln lived."

What were Mr. Lincoln's views respecting the future of the freedmen? What was his plan of reconstruction? Was Frank Blair as accurate in his statement of Mr. Lincoln's policy in those directions as he was in his forecast of the purposes of the Radicals? In the collection of Lincoln papers, possessed by William K. Bixby of St. Louis, is the original letter of the President upon the restoration of state government in Arkansas. It was addressed to General Steele, at Little Rock. It was written in the winter of 1864, not far distant from the time Frank Blair outlined the President's policy toward the States which had seceded. Residents of Arkansas petitioned for authority to hold an election and to set up a state government which would be recognized at Washington. Mr. Lincoln, in his own hand, wrote to General Steele, in charge of the military division which included Arkansas. He gave explicit instructions. He stipulated that the new state government must come into existence with the full recognition of the principle embraced in what afterwards became the thirteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States. That there might be no misunderstanding Mr. Lincoln copied into his letter the language of the condition upon which the new state government was to be recognized. The letter illustrated the earnest desire of Mr. Lincoln to rehabilitate state governments in the Confederacy. Thus, more than twelve months before the final surrender, the President laid the foundation for restoration of civil authority in Arkansas. Restoration was the word, not reconstruction. The letter concluded:

"You will please order an election immediately and perform the other parts assigned you with necessary incidentals, all according to the foregoing."

In his own words, written by himself, the President expressed his purpose to make the way for the Confederate States to get back into the Union simple and expeditious.

The thirteenth amendment submission bill did not pass the Senate until the 8th of April, 1864. It did not obtain the necessary two-thirds in the House until the next session of Congress. It was ratified by thirty-one States and proclaimed in force in December, 1865. And yet nearly two years before, Mr. Lincoln incorporated the language with his own hand as the principal condition of the creation of a new state government for Arkansas. The language made no stipulation as to negro suffrage. It only required that Arkansas organize with a provision against slavery in these words:

"There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except in the punishment of crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, but the General Assembly may make such provision for the freed-people as shall recognize and declare their permanent freedom, provide for their education, and which may yet be consistent, as a temporary arrangement, with their present condition as a laboring, landless and homeless class."

This was Mr. Lincoln's policy of state restoration. The other conditions imposed upon the Southern States, of which negro suffrage was chief, came after the death of the President.

Executive Mansion,  
Washington, D. C., Jan. 20, 1864.

Major General Steele:

Sundry citizens of the State of Arkansas petition me that an election may be held in that State; that it be assumed at said election, and thenceforward, that the constitution and laws of the State, as before the rebellion, are in full force, excepting that the constitution is so modified as to declare that "There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except in the punishment of crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted; but the General Assembly may make such provision for the freed-people as shall recognize and declare their permanent freedom, provide for their education, and which may yet be consistent, as a temporary arrangement, with their present condition as a laboring, landless, and homeless class;" ever also except that all now existing laws in re-

lation to slaves are inoperative and void; that said election be held on the twenty-eighth day of March next at all the usual voting places of the State, or all such as voters may attend for that purpose; that the voters attending at each place, at eight o'clock in the morning of said day, may choose judges and clerks of election for that place; that all persons qualified by said constitution and laws, and taking the oath prescribed in the President's proclamation of December the 8th, 1863, either before or at the election, and none others, may be voters provided that persons having the qualifications aforesaid, and being in the volunteer military service of the United States, may vote once wherever they may be at voting places; that each set of judges and clerks may make return directly to you, on or before the eleventh day of April next; that in all other respects said election may be conducted according to said modified constitution, and laws; that, on receipt of said returns, you count said votes, and that, if the number shall reach, or exceed, five thousand four hundred and six, you canvass said votes and ascertain who shall thereby appear to have been elected Governor; and that on the eighteenth day of April next, the person so appearing to have been elected, and appearing before you at Little Rock, to have, by you, administered to him an oath to support the Constitution of the United States and said modified constitution of the State of Arkansas, and actually taking said oath, be by you declared qualified, and be enjoined to immediately enter upon the duties of the office of Governor of said State; and that you thereupon declare the constitution of the State of Arkansas to have been modified and assumed as aforesaid, by the action of the people as aforesaid.

You will please order an election immediately, and perform the other parts assigned you, with necessary incidentals, all according to the foregoing.

Yours truly,

A. Lincoln.

The original of this letter is entirely in the handwriting of Mr. Lincoln. Painstaking is not the word that applies to Mr. Lincoln's writing. The pen or pencil moved over the page easily, naturally, readily. That is apparent from the style of writing. Even stronger evidence is found in the volume of written matter which Mr. Lincoln turned out. From the beginning of his career as a lawyer down through the busiest days in the White House, Mr. Lincoln wrote and wrote. There are in existence letters and papers of his penmanship in greater number, probably than any other President

wrote. The letters number thousands. Many of them bear evidence that they were not answers and need not have been written, and would not have been written by one to whom writing was irksome, or in any sense a task. Mr. Lincoln liked to write so well that he seldom dictated anything.

In the extensive and varied collection of Lincoln writings owned by Mr. Bixby are many interesting revelations of this strong penmanship habit of Mr. Lincoln. Whether in letter, law paper or state document, the composition was simple and closely condensed. But this did not mean that Mr. Lincoln wished to get through as quickly as possible. It indicated the habit of mind. There are few letters of Mr. Lincoln which exceed a page. The longest writing in the Bixby collection is the letter to General Steele setting forth the complete plan of restoration of civil government for Arkansas. It is of nearly four pages and written on one side of the paper. The date is significant, taken in connection with Blair's speech in Congress. The President dated his letter on the 24th of January. Blair spoke on the 24th of February.

#### LINCOLN, MISSOURI AND MEXICO.

When it was evident that the Confederacy was doomed, President Lincoln gave thought to the future of the Missourians who had gone with the South. He realized that there were numbers of these who had cut the ties of home and kindred. With the surrender, many Confederates, especially from Missouri and other border States, would feel that they were men without a country. Houses had been burned. Farms had been laid waste. Property had been confiscated. Emancipation had wrought chaos in labor relations which might require years for adjustment. These conditions, which would confront the soldiers returning to the border States, were dangerous. They might lead to feuds without number and much bloodshed. Mr. Lincoln talked with his advisers about this situation. He consulted with Frank Blair.

Across the Rio Grande there was revolution. European governments, taking advantage of the Civil War in the United States, were attempting to set up an empire. The United States had protested through diplomatic channels against this violation of the Monroe doctrine. Under Juarez the republican elements of Mexico were fighting against Maximilian, but they were with difficulty holding the northern part of their country. The closing act of Mr. Lincoln's cherished border states policy was to turn the western Confederates toward Mexico as soon as their own cause was lost. And, as on the former occasions noted, Mr. Lincoln looked to Missouri to work out this policy.

Francis P. Blair and Joseph O. Shelby were cousins. Early in 1861, when Blair knew that war was inevitable, he sent for Shelby, who was living in Lafayette county, to come to St. Louis. He exerted all of his powers of persuasion to induce Shelby to remain with the Union. On the strength of his close relations with Mr. Lincoln, Blair assured Shelby of a good commission in the army. Shelby, however, had made up his mind to go with the South.

With the war nearing the end, President Lincoln made Blair the medium of his communication to the western Confederates and Blair communicated the plan to Shelby. Not only was no obstacle to be thrown in the way of Confederates marching to Mexico but tacit encouragement was to be given. Moreover it was to be understood that federal soldiers who had not had enough of the adventures of war might join the Confederates, cross the Rio Grande, join Juarez and help work out the salvation of Mexico.

Shelby led an expedition to Mexico and was not interfered with. But the plan as President Lincoln conceived it was not carried through. In 1877 there was much newspaper talk about an invasion of Mexico by Americans. Affairs in that country had become unsettled. Reports were spread that Americans were organizing under strong leadership to go into Mexico with the view of settling there and insuring stability of government and lasting peace. General Shelby's name was much mentioned as a possible leader in the move-

ment. He was living on his farm in Missouri. Some expression from him was wanted by the northern and eastern newspapers. Through the influence of Major John N. Edwards, who had been on Shelby's staff in the war, the much desired interview was obtained. General Shelby with emphasis put an end of the use of his name in connection with the proposed movement. And then he told of Mr. Lincoln's plan for the western Confederates: He said:

"Through General Frank P. Blair I had received, long before the killing of Lincoln, some important information. It was to the effect that in the downfall of the Confederacy and the overthrow of the Confederates of the east, the Confederates of the west would be permitted to march into Mexico, drive out the French, fraternize with the Mexicans, look around them to see what they could see, occupy and possess land, keep their eyes fixed steadfastly upon the future, and understand from the beginning that the future would have to take care of itself. In addition, every disbanded federal soldier in the trans-Mississippi department, who desired service of the kind I have indicated, would have been permitted to cross over to the Confederates with his arms and ammunition. Fifty thousand of these were eager to enlist in such an expedition. On my march south from San Antonio to Piedras Negras I received no less than 200 messages and communications from representative Federal officers begging me to wait for them beyond the Rio Grande."

"Do you mean to say, General, that President Lincoln was in favor of the movement you have outlined?"

"I do mean to say so most emphatically. I could show nothing official for my assertion, but I had such assurances as satisfied me, and other officers of either army had such assurances as satisfied them. There was empire in it, and a final and practical settlement of this whole Mexican question."

"Why did the scheme fail?"

"I will tell you why. Before marching into the interior of Mexico from Piedras Negras, a little town on the Rio Grande opposite Eagle Pass, I called my officers and men about me and stated to them briefly the case. Governor Blesca, the Juarez governor of Coahuila, was in Piedras Negras. I had sold him cannon, muskets, ammunition, revolvers, sabres,—munitions of war which I had brought out of Texas in quantities,—and had divided the proceeds per capita among my men. Governor Blesca offered me the military possession of New Leon and Coahuila, a major generalship, and absolute authority to recruit a corps of 50,000 Americans. All these things I told my followers. Then I

laid a scheme before them and mapped out for the future a programme which had for a granite basis, as it were, that one irrevocable idea of empire. But to my surprise and almost despair nearly the entire expeditionary force were resolute and aggressive imperialists. I could not move them from the idea of fighting for Maximilian. They hated Juarez, they said, and they hated his cause. Maximilian had been the friend of the South; so had the French; so had Louis Napoleon. They would not lift a hand against the imperial government. I did not argue with my soldiers. They had been faithful to me beyond everything I had ever known of devotion, and so I said to them, 'You have made your resolve, so be it!'

There is strongly corroborative proof of General Shelby's statement that the western Confederates were to be allowed to march away to Mexico. When Lee surrendered, the trans-Mississippi army numbered about 50,000 men. The commander was Kirby Smith. The officers held a council at Marshall, Texas, and decided to march to Mexico. Kirby Smith was to resign and Buckner was to command. But Smith declined to resign and Buckner didn't want to go. Division after division was called to Shreveport and disarmed. Shelby called for volunteers and led 1,000 men to Mexico. At the close of the Civil war, Sheridan was hurried to the Mexican border. Juarez was given moral and material support from the United States side. The French were warned away; Maximilian was defeated, captured, condemned to death and executed on the hill of Queretaro.

#### THE FAREWELL MESSAGE TO MISSOURI.

Not two months before his death, fifty-one days before the surrender of Lee, President Lincoln sent to Missouri what was to be his farewell message. The letter was dated the latter part of February, 1865. The Missouri Constitutional convention had abolished slavery. The delegates were preparing that ill-advised, proscriptive, short-lived organic act, with its test oaths which were to create turmoil for a generation in the State, which passed into history as the Drake constitution. Mr. Lincoln wrote, entreating Governor Fletcher to get together the contending factions and to harmonize the people irrespective of what they had "thought, said, or done

about the war or about anything else." He even suggested a plan of detail by which he believed this might be accomplished. The Hon. Benjamin B. Cahoon, Sr., of Fredericktown, lifelong student of Lincoln who stopped and sympathized with him as he lay wounded after Gettysburg, has said of this farewell message to Missouri:

"In no document of Lincoln's is his kindness and humanity better exhibited. It can be classed with his first and second Inaugural addresses and his Gettysburg oration."

A fitting conclusion to this narrative of Lincoln and Missouri is this letter of the President to Governor Fletcher:

Executive Mansion,  
Washington, February 20, 1865.

His Excellency, Governor Fletcher:

It seems that there is now no organized military force of the enemy in Missouri, and yet that destruction of property and life is rampant everywhere. Is not the cure for this within easy reach of the people themselves? It cannot be but that every man, not naturally a robber or cutthroat, would gladly put an end to this state of things. A large majority in every locality must feel alike upon this subject; and if so they only need to reach an understanding one with another. Each leaving all others alone solves the problem; and surely each would do this but for his apprehension that others will not leave him alone. Cannot this mischievous distrust be removed? Let neighborhood meetings be everywhere called and held of all entertaining a sincere purpose for mutual security in the future, whatever they may heretofore have thought, said, or done about the war or about anything else. Let all such meet, and, waiving all else, pledge each to cease harassing others, and to make common cause against whoever persists in making, aiding, or encouraging further disturbance. The practical means they will best know how to adopt and apply. At such meetings old friendships will cross the memory, and honor and Christian charity will come in to help. Please consider whether it may not be well to suggest this to the now afflicted people of Missouri.

Yours Truly,

A. LINCOLN.

AUG 1865









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